

Immigration and Trust in Politics in Britain

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Abstract

Levels of opposition to immigration in Britain have remained high since the 1960s, and yet the implications of such opposition are often unclear. We argue that concerns about immigration may have indirect effects on the functioning of the British government via their effects on trust in politics. Using the pre- and post-election panel component of the 2005 British Election Study, supplemented by the 2003-3 European Election Study, we illustrate that after controlling for a wide range of other predictors of trust in politics, concerns about the impact of immigration, along with the perception that government has not handled the issue of immigration effectively, significantly affect trust in the British parliament, British politicians, and the British police.

Since the arrival of the *Empire Windrush* from Jamaica in 1948, immigrants and immigration have become contentious parts of the British political landscape, and in the 1960s, David Butler and Donald Stokes noted that immigration had a ‘high potential’ to affect British elections.¹ In the decades that followed the *Windrush*’s arrival, British opposition to further immigration to the country has been high. For instance, in the 1960s, roughly 85 per cent of British citizens felt that too many immigrants had been let into the country.² In the 1990s, approximately 65 per cent in Britain thought that immigrants abused the system of social benefits and that schools suffered where there were more immigrants.³ More recently, the 2003 British Social Attitudes Survey indicated that 75 per cent of respondents were in favour of increased immigration restrictions.⁴

Although the issue of immigration has not, in fact, dominated elections in Britain, every so often British politicians bring the issue into the political limelight at election time. For instance, Conservative candidate Peter Griffith (Smethwick, Birmingham) introduced the issue into the 1964 election campaign, and it was again raised by Enoch Powell in 1968. Riots in Notting Hill, Lewisham, Deptford, Brixton, Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester, and Leeds kept the issue on the agenda in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, and new immigration and asylum seeking once again became of public concern in the 1990s and the start of the 21st Century, as first asylum seekers from war-

¹ David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice* (London: Macmillan, 1974, 2nd edition), pp. 303-5.

² Butler and Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, p. 303.

³ Eurobarometer 47.1 *Images of Switzerland, Education throughout life, Racism, and Patterns of Family Planning and Work Status*, March-April 1997.

⁴ Lauren McLaren and Mark Johnson, ‘The Rising Tide of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Britain’, in Alison Park et al, eds *British Social Attitudes 21st report 2004* (London: Sage Publications, 2004), p. 172.

torn regions and then economic immigrants from poorer European Union member states made their way to the UK after the 2004 EU enlargement.

Despite the periodic predominance of issues of race and immigration on the British public agenda, identifying specific consequences of concern about these issues for the functioning of British politics is less than straightforward. In particular, it is difficult to argue that concern about race or immigration has had any large-scale effect on electoral outcomes or any effect on the UK party system as a whole. In the highly charged atmosphere of the mid-1960s, for instance, Butler and Stokes concluded that—despite the above-mentioned potential to affect elections—immigration, in fact, had no discernable effect on the general election outcomes in 1964 or 1966. Immigration *may* have had some impact on voting in the 1970 election⁵ and in early 1978, in the run-up to the election the following year, Margaret Thatcher appeared to bring the issue onto the electoral agenda with her televised pronouncement that ‘people can feel rather swamped’ by immigration.⁶ It was not until the 2005 election, however, that a mainstream party leader sought to win votes on the basis of concerns about immigration, and while this may have had some effect on voting behaviour⁷, the overall impact on the election outcome is likely to have been relatively marginal.⁸ For the most part, it appears that

⁵ Butler and Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, pp. 306-308.

⁶ David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1979* (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 28.

⁷ Jane Green and Sara B. Hobolt, ‘Owning the Issue Agenda: Party Strategies and Vote Choices in British Elections’, *Electoral Studies*, 27 (2008), 460-76, p. 472.

⁸ Andrew Geddes and Jonathan Tonge, *Britain Decides: The UK General Election 2005* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); Dennis Kavanagh and David Butler, *The British general election of 2005* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

other issues—for instance, the economy or foreign policy—and perceptions of party leaders generally dominate British elections.⁹

This situation is in stark contrast to many European party systems, in which concerns about immigration find outlets in parties such as the *Front National* in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (and in the 2002 and 2003 elections, *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*), or the Freedom Party in Austria and the more extreme Freedom Party breakaway party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria. In countries such as these, immigration-related concerns gain some expression in the ‘legitimate’ political institutions by achieving representation in these institutions. The UK political system, in contrast, provides very few institutional outlets for the expression of concern about immigration. Although the BNP and UKIP attempt to attract votes on the basis of such sentiment, most voters in the UK will not vote for either of these parties in general elections, presumably because voters realize neither of these parties has any realistic chance of winning enough votes to win even a single parliamentary constituency, much less enough seats to take part in government.

In addition, while mainstream centre-right parties in other parts of Europe have provided an additional outlet for anti-immigration sentiment by co-opting the platform and rhetoric of the far-right (as is the case periodically in France, for instance), in the UK the two dominant political parties have often held similar policy positions on immigration, making it difficult for citizens to vote on this particular issue. Specifically, both parties have traditionally claimed to want to stem the flow of migration to the UK while simultaneously supporting policies to protect those already in the UK from

⁹ Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart and Paul Whiteley, ‘Taking the Bloom off New Labour’s Rose: Party Choice and Voter Turnout in Britain, 2005’, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 16 (2006), 3-36.

discrimination.¹⁰ Thus, distinguishing between the two parties on the issue of immigration may pose some difficulty for British citizens. Perhaps more important is that both parties appear to be more-or-less divided on the issue of immigration, with Labour officials such as David Blunkett previously speaking fairly negatively about immigration and immigrants,¹¹ on the one hand, and Conservative party members expressing unease over the introduction of immigration or race into party rhetoric, on the other.¹² As mentioned above, even when the issue is specifically introduced by the Conservative Party in an election—as in 2005—it appears that other variables, such as leadership qualities and performance on policies other than immigration, are likely to be more important in explaining vote choices.¹³ This paper suggests that while immigration-related worries may have little impact on electoral outcomes in Britain, they may still affect the British political system by reducing trust in British politicians and political

¹⁰ Randall Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Although the Labour Party in the 1997-2005 period appeared to be far more favourable to increased immigration, the fall-out from the unexpectedly large-scale migration from Central and Eastern Europe after the 2004 enlargement of the EU seems to have propelled the creation of more restrictive immigration legislation, using a points-based system to discourage low-skilled migration to the UK (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7269790.stm, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7904393.stm, or http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7951721.stm, all accessed 14 July 2009). It is not entirely clear that immigration policies of Conservative governments would be that different from those of the Labour government (See, for instance, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7677962.stm, accessed 14 July 2009).

¹¹ For instance, in 2002, then Home Secretary Blunkett suggested that immigrants speak English in their own homes, advised Asians to stop making arranged marriages in their home countries and make them within the UK instead and compared Muslim forced marriages with practices of medieval England (see *The Times*, 16 September 2002, p. 1g, 1 June 2002, p. 2e, and 15 January 2002, p. 8f).

¹² On the cross-time positions of political parties on immigration and race see Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*; James Hampshire, *Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the Politics of Demographic Governance in Postwar Britain* (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Kathleen Paul, *Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); in the most recent election (2005), Conservative leader Michael Howard appeared to attempt to distance himself and his party somewhat from this issue—despite incorporating it as an important part of the party’s platform—by arguing that immigration was only one of its five important issues, and some moderates in the Conservative party were ‘annoyed’ at the prominence given to immigration by some of the Conservative candidates (see Kavanagh and Butler, *The British General Election of 2005*, p. 76).

¹³ Geddes and Tonge, *Britain Decides: The UK General Election 2005*; Kavanagh and Butler, *The British General Election of 2005*; Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, ‘Taking the Bloom off New Labour’s Rose’.

institutions. We now turn to an explanation for why this is likely to be the case, an explanation which revolves around the construction of British national identity and the relationship between immigration and immigration policy to British identity. After discussing this relationship and the hypothesized connection between identity, immigration, and political trust, the paper uses the 2005 British Election Study (pre- and post-election), supplemented with the 2002-3 European Social Survey, to examine the relationship between concern about immigration and political trust.

The Construction and Nature of British National Identity¹⁴

Most international relations scholars would argue that modern states—particularly modern European states—were built upon notions of shared identity and values. Some scholars believe that the creation of common identity resulted from modern advances in transportation and printing, both of which are fairly important for the creation of a common language, which is, in turn, important for the articulation of common values across a large territory.¹⁵ Others believe there may have also been an active attempt on the part of state leaders to construct such an identity.¹⁶ Still others contend that common identity across large territories originates from a primordial human need for connection, and that modernization produced a transposition of notions of family (and particularly super-family) onto others living within state territory.¹⁷ Many of these hypotheses imply

¹⁴ Note that the analysis in this paper includes only Great Britain (i.e., it excludes Northern Ireland), and so the geographical and cultural entity being discussed here is Great Britain rather than the United Kingdom (see footnote 51).

¹⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Books, 1991).

¹⁶ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge University Press, 1992).

¹⁷ Pierre van den Berghe, 'Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1 (1978), 401-11.

a considerable amount of artificiality in the construction of national identities. Anthony Smith, however, contends that while the creation of the modern nation-state was made possible by economic and bureaucratic modernization, and particularly one key component of modernization—mass education—he also contends that ‘the presence of a core *ethnie* around which strong states could be built’ made the creation of nations possible.¹⁸ That is, such states have been built around shared cultural heritage and norms.¹⁹

In the early configurations of English identity and then later British identity²⁰ there were fairly clear divisions between those who envisioned the latter as being connected to acceptance of the fundamental principle of parliamentary or Crown-in-

¹⁸ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), p. 61.

¹⁹ Smith argues that the construction of British national identity has its roots in the early post-Norman Conquest era when there was considerable intermarriage and elite mobility between the Normans and upper-stratum Saxons, along with an increasingly centralized state bureaucracy and the centralizing forces of Catholicism. By the fourteenth century, at least amongst elites, language had fused and crystallized into Chaucerian English and according to Smith a common myth of British descent had been outlined by the end of the twelfth century (Smith, *National Identity*). Smith does not contend that British national identity had formed on a mass-level at this stage but does contend that these events served as the basis on which elites and masses would develop national identity. The creation of a system of public education and improvements in transport and communication across the territory thus created conditions in which an already developing elite identity also spread to the masses. Greenfeld highlights the importance of the English Bible in spreading English identity to the masses (see Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 52, 54, 69, 86), while Colley indicates that *British* identity was developed after the union with Scotland in 1707, with the wars with France between 1773 and 1815 helping to unify the island against the French Catholic ‘Other’. The Industrial Revolution and British Empire are also argued to have been key to the construction of British identity (see Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, 2nd ed, (New Haven, Conn. and London: Yale University Press, 1994)). The Industrial Revolution and British Empire are also argued to have been key to the construction of British identity.

²⁰ This is not to say that other identities were obliterated by these ongoing processes. Colley, for instance, contends that British identity was overlaid onto Scottish, Welsh, and local English identities. Robbins goes one step further and argues that while these local and regional identities were not eliminated, there was some degree of blending between English, Scottish, and Welsh which made the creation of a stable nation-state possible; that is, without some degree of blending such stability would be unlikely.²⁰ Along with the wars discussed by Colley, it is contended that extensions of the franchise and national unity in the Great War (and presumably World War Two) helped to confirm at least some degree of cohesion in Britain Keith Robbins, ‘The Imperial and Multinational Polity: The ‘Scene from the Centre’, 1832-1922’, in Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer, eds, *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 244-254; also Keith Robbins, *Nineteenth-Century Britain: Integration and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

parliament sovereignty and those who believed British identity to be built upon notions of human dignity that implied popular sovereignty. At least in terms of actual policy, the latter appeared to eventually win the day, as the franchise was extended, first to the majority of male citizens with the Representation of the People Act of 1884 and eventually to most men and women with the Representation of the People Act of 1918, and the power of the Crown was gradually reduced. The expansion of national identity beyond the elite level (see footnote 19) thus coincided to some extent with increased democratization of Britain. The state, in this conception, therefore existed for the purpose of expression of interests by free and equal citizens and for the purpose of policymaking on the basis of these interests.²¹ This eventually led to the making of policies that aimed to increase the social welfare, particularly to improve health care, of citizens. Connecting this to immigration, it is clear that in the modern British (welfare) state, it is crucial to stipulate who has access to policymaking decisions and to the benefits that are produced from such policies, such as health care, a point to which we return below.²²

²¹ Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, pp. 31-32; David Marquand, 'How united is the modern United Kingdom?', in Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer, eds, *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 287-8; Robbins, 'The Imperial and Multinational Polity', pp. 251-2.

²² It must be noted that the apparent increase in Welsh and Scottish identity and growing demands from Scotland for separation after World War Two have called into question the degree to which 'Britishness' has 'stuck', but such demands may have been connected to extraordinary dissatisfaction and unease with Thatcherite policies in particular and the prior discovery of North Sea oil, and the clamouring for separation appears to have been reduced in the post-Thatcher era (although the SNP continues to promise a referendum on membership of the UK). While public opinion polls on separatism in Scotland are very dependent on question wording, it appears that a majority of Scots would prefer to stay in the UK but with greater devolved powers for Scotland (see, for instance, 'How SNP could win and lose at the same time', *The Times*, 20 April 2007; 'Do the Scots support independence?', Channel 4, 18 January 2007; http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/domestic_politics/factcheck+do+the+scots+support+independence/251043; <http://thescotsmen.com/politics/Pressure-on-parties--to.5415942.jp>, accessed 7 July 2009). Supporting evidence from the British Election Study of 2005 indicates that only 32 per cent of respondents living in Scotland claimed to identify as Scottish only, with other respondents acknowledging some degree of British identity; in Wales this figure is only 16 per cent. (Note that 14.4 per cent of England's respondents claimed to be English not British.) Thus the majority of people living in Britain today appear to claim some degree of common British identity.

Scholars since Kohn²³ have generally accepted a distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism and have shown that these often form two different components of identity. There is also acceptance of Kohn’s argument that different countries are based on one or the other of the two types of identities, with Western Europe and the USA considered to fit the civic model and Central and Eastern Europe fitting an ethnic model.²⁴ Some of these ideas have been supported by research on citizenship policy, which has confirmed the existence of different models of citizenship based on different understandings of identity. According to these approaches, the British case would clearly fit into the civic model of national identity, implying that nationalism is based on attachment to political practices, and values and notions of a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, rather than an ethnic model, in which identity is based on descent, culture, language and customs.²⁵

Recent research has questioned the extent to which nations can, in fact, be distinguished along these two dimensions and contends that most nations are likely to emphasize both components.²⁶ Indeed, Schulman’s analysis of the 1995 International Social Survey Project clearly indicates that British citizens emphasize civic, cultural, and ethnic components when considering British identity. That is, the vast majority emphasize spending most of one’s life in the country, being born in the country, and

²³ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan, 1944); Hans Kohn, *Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1946). Hans Kohn, *The Twentieth Century: A Mid-way Account of the Western World* (New York: Macmillan 1949).

²⁴ See Stephen Schulman, ‘Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism’, *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (2002): 554-85.

²⁵ Smith, *National Identity*, p. 12; Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1993), pp. 6-9.

²⁶ Schulman, ‘Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies’ ; Taras Kuzio, The myth of the civic state: a critical survey of Hans Kohn’s framework for understanding nationalism’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25 (2002): 20-39.

respect for political institutions and practices, but the majority also emphasize cultural elements such as speaking English, the need for minorities to share the country's customs and traditions, and the majority also clearly reject the idea that racial and ethnic groups should be able to maintain their distinct customs and traditions.

In addition, citizenship policy itself in Britain provides some clues about the importance of descent, culture, language and customs in the construction of British identity. Traditionally the main difficulty in reconciling nationality and citizenship in Britain has revolved around the former British Empire. On the one hand, Britishness had been conceived as a sort-of cosmopolitan identity to be spread to other parts of the globe; on the other, faced with migration from these other parts of the globe, it became questionable as to how far the construct of Britishness could be stretched. As outlined by many others,²⁷ until the early 1980s official immigration policy in Britain attempted to maintain this cosmopolitan veneer while the execution of immigration policy aimed at restricting migration from the New Commonwealth (i.e., countries other than Canada, Australia and New Zealand), and later these distinctions were more clearly outlined in legislation. In 1971, for instance, a new category of 'patrial' was created, and the Immigration Act of that year stipulated that citizenship would be restricted to those fitting into this category. In fact, the category included only those born in Britain or with a British-born or naturalized parent or grandparent. In practice, this meant that non-white citizens of the New Commonwealth lost the right to enter Britain while the predominantly white descendents of the Old Commonwealth maintained the right of

²⁷ David Cesarani, 'The Changing Character of Citizenship and Nationality in Britain', in David Cesarani and Mary Fullbrook, eds, *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996); Hampshire, *Citizenship and Belonging*; Paul, *Whitewashing Britain*; Christian Joppke, 'Asylum and State Sovereignty: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Britain', *Comparative Political Studies*, 30 (1997), 259–98; Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*.

entry and citizenship in the UK.²⁸ As argued by Christian Joppke, 'Forced to define who belongs, British immigration policy resorted to birth and ancestry, thus introducing an ethnic marker that had so far been absent from the definition of Britishness'.²⁹

Although the ethnic marker has been removed from citizenship and immigration policy in modern-day Britain, citizenship laws still emphasize an understanding of British values, culture and politics, as well as knowledge of the predominant language, English.³⁰ Moreover, it is clear that non-minority British citizens are uneasy with the country's new country-of-immigration status. For instance, as discussed above, the 2003 British Social Attitudes Survey indicated that 75 per cent were in favour of increased immigration restrictions, a rise of almost 10 per cent since 1995.³¹ Perhaps more revealing is that the majority in that same survey believed that it *was impossible for those not sharing Britain's customs and traditions to become fully British* and expressed concern about the loyalty and commitment of one of Britain's main non-Christian minorities, Muslims.³² Although a clear majority (72 per cent) were unwilling stipulate that one must be *white* to be British, the emphasis on *culture and heritage* was still quite strong.³³

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²⁸ Cesarani, 'The Changing Character of Citizenship and Nationality in Britain', p. 66. See also Hampshire, *Citizenship and Belonging*; Paul, *Whitewashing Britain*; see also Christian Joppke, 'Asylum and State Sovereignty', pp. 259–98; Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*.

²⁹ Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, p. 105.

³⁰ Home Office, *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship* (TSO Information and Publishing Solutions, 2007).

³¹ McLaren and Johnson, 'The Rising Tide of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Britain', p. 172.

³² Lauren McLaren and Mark Johnson, 'Resources, Group Conflict, and Symbols: Explaining Anti-Immigration Hostility in Britain', *Political Studies*, 55 (2007), 709–732, pp. 720–21.

³³ Cesarani contends that the increased use of notions of customs and culture to distinguish certain groups of new immigrants is a form of 'new racism' (Cesarani 'The Changing Character of Citizenship and Nationality in Britain', p. 69).

Research on social identities has long pointed to the conclusion that identities—even artificially constructed laboratory-based identities—are meaningful to individuals, because they contribute positively to self-esteem and self-image and because they help to provide clarity in a complex, confusing world.³⁴ The inference is therefore that long-established identities like national identities are even more relevant and powerful, no matter how artificial they may appear to the outside observer. Immigrants pose clear threats to these identities by bringing with them seemingly different values and ways of life³⁵; they may also be perceived to threaten the economic resources of fellow countrymen and women.³⁶ Particularly in countries like Britain in which the main myths of identity have not tended to include the myth of being accepting of migrants (compared to the myths of identity in the United States, for instance), it may be unclear to many British citizens as to how to reconstruct identity to incorporate newcomers. Newcomers who may be perceived as holding extremely different values from those of Britons—Muslim migrants vis-à-vis a predominantly secular Britain, for instance—may be particularly difficult to reconcile with existing national identities. In short, the concepts of nationhood and citizenship draw dividing lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and foster fear of

³⁴ Henri Tajfel, ‘Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination’, *Scientific American*, 223 (1970), 96-102; John C. Turner, ‘Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group’, in Henri Tajfel (ed), *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 15-40; John C. Turner, ‘Social Categorization and the Self-Concept: A Social Cognitive Theory of Group Behavior’, *Advances in Group Processes* 2 (1985), pp. 77-122; John C. Turner, Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen D. Reicher, and Margaret S. Wetherell, eds. *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); John C. Turner, Penelope J. Oakes, S. Alexander Haslam, and Craig M. McGarty, ‘Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Context’, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20 (1994), pp. 454-63.

³⁵ Paul M. Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn and Markus Prior, ‘Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities’, *American Political Science Review*, 98(2004), 35-49.

³⁶ Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior. ‘Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers’; Lincoln Quillian, ‘Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe’, *American Sociological Review*, 60(1995), 586-611.

those with whom we do not share common identity. By introducing difference migration conflicts with the unifying agenda required by nationhood.³⁷

The difficulty of coming to terms with new migrants, in turn, has potential implications for the British political system. Political systems are thought to be prone to failure if individuals in the system are not ‘sufficiently oriented toward one another’ and willing to support the existence of a group of individuals who can negotiate and settle differences.³⁸ Some research into social capital has already come to the conclusion that immigration and multiculturalism *may* create problems for the former of these conditions (i.e., orientation toward one another), although it must be noted that the evidence is somewhat mixed.³⁹ Immigration may also create problems for the latter—i.e., the willingness to support the existence of a group of individuals who can engage in policymaking—and reduce willingness to support the institutions through which these groups of elites govern. This is because feelings of disunity are not likely to apply solely to feelings of citizens for one another but are also likely to stretch to feelings about the elites in this community as well. Indeed, evidence indicates that individuals tend to be

³⁷ Jef Huysmans, ‘Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of ‘Securitizing’ Societal Issues’, in Robert Miles and Dietrich Thränhardt (eds), *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (London: Pinter, 1995), p. 60.

³⁸ David Easton, ‘An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems’, *World Politics*, 9(1957), 383-40, p. 391; see also Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, *Comparative Politics*, 2 (1970), 337-363; David Miller (2000) also argues for the desirability of national identity in helping to create a more just society (see David Miller, ‘Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Theoretical Reflections’, in Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, eds, *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006]).

³⁹ Christopher J. Anderson and Aida Paskeviciute, ‘How ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity influence the prospects for civil society: A comparative study of citizenship behavior’, *Journal of Politics*, 68 (2006), 783-802; Alberto F. Alesina, and Eliana La Ferrara, ‘Participation in Heterogeneous Communities’, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115 (2000), 847–904; Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn, ‘Civic Engagement in Heterogeneous Communities’, *Perspectives on Politics*, 1 (2003), 103–112; *but see* Dietlind Stolle, Stuart Soroka and Richard Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust? Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediating Effect of Social Interactions’, *Political Studies*, 56(2008), 57-75; Natalia Letki, ‘Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in British Neighbourhoods’, *Political Studies*, 56(2008), 99-126; Marc Hooghe, Tim Reeskens, Dietlind Stolle, Ann Trappers, ‘Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust: A Cross-National Multilevel Study’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 42 (2009), 198-223.

increasingly less favourable toward using the institutions of the state to reduce poverty and provide welfare *as a result of perceptions of cultural differences between groups who access these services*.⁴⁰ Moreover, the British political system and its notions of political equality are argued to have been layered onto pre-existing cultural connections;⁴¹ a perceived weakening of these cultural connections because of immigration is also likely to subsequently weaken attachment to this political system.

In short, it is clear that immigration creates widespread concern about political and social community and about social identities.⁴² Moreover, under pre-mass-immigration conceptualizations of national identity, the institutions through which elites governed the national polity were designed to govern and adjudicate between members of the *national* community. When individuals perceive that immigration has threatened that community the institutions that govern them are likely to be called into question. That is, those most attuned to the effects of immigration on the national community may question the extent to which national political institutions exist to represent a national citizenry. Moreover, it is likely that individuals specifically blame their political elites and institutions for allowing large-scale migration in the first place and thus hold these elites and institutions in contempt as a result. While some of the prior research discussed above

⁴⁰Martin Gilens, *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Anti-Poverty Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); James Habyarimana, James Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M Weinstein, 'Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?', *American Political Science Review* 101(2007): 709-25.

⁴¹ Smith, *National Identity*, p. 12.

⁴² Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior. 'Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers'; Lauren McLaren and Mark Johnson, 'Resources, Group Conflict, and Symbols: Explaining Anti-Immigration Hostility in Britain'; Gallya Lahav, *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, 'Threatened by Diversity: Why Restrictive Asylum and Immigration Policies Appeal to Western Europeans', *Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties*, 15 (2005), 21–46; Rachel Gibson, *The Growth of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe* (Lewiston NY: Mellen Press, 2002) ; Joel S. Fetzer, *Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Thomas J. Espenshade, T. J. and Charles Calhoun, 'An Analysis of Public Opinion toward Undocumented Immigration', *Population Research and Policy Review*, 12 (1993), 189–224.

hints at the connection between immigration and perceptions of political systems, there is not yet an investigation of this relationship. The analysis here takes a first step in filling this gap.

We examine three micro-level propositions regarding the relationship between immigration and trust in politics. First, we expect that concern about the impact of immigration on the national community, including the culture and economy of that community, will be related to distrust in politics. More specifically, such concern is expected to reduce both trust in the institutions of government and the people who run the institutions. Thus, as argued above, to the extent that national community is perceived as being under threat from immigration, the legitimacy of the institutions which were designed to govern this community are also likely to be called into question. Even more directly, those who blame government for mishandling the immigration issue are likely to be distrustful, again, of the institutions and the elites running them. That is, one of the main functions of government in modern states is to protect the national territory and community. Those who believe government has failed in this task are therefore likely to conclude that the institutions and politicians governing the country cannot be trusted to carry out even this most basic function. Moreover, we expect that this effect will be even stronger for those with a heightened concern about the impact of immigration on the national community. The specific propositions we investigate are as follows.

Hypothesis 1 Those expressing most concern about the impact of immigration on the national community will be least trusting of politicians and political institutions.

Hypothesis 2 Those who believe the government has done a poor job of handling immigration will be least trusting of politicians and political institutions.

Hypothesis 3 The relationship between concern about immigration and perceptions of government handling of immigration will be interactive: those who are most concerned about immigration and believe the government has handled the immigration issue poorly will be the least trusting of politicians and political institutions.⁴³

We now turn to the 2005 British Election Study survey and the 2002-3 European Social Survey to investigate these propositions.

Analysis 1: The 2005 British Election Study

According to Miller and Listhaug, political trust

reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in accordance with normative expectations held by the public.

Citizen expectations of how government should operate include, among other

⁴³ In some contexts it might be appropriate to also try to incorporate indicators of numbers of immigrants; however, in the British case we assume that perceptions about immigration are generally determined more by national-level phenomena such as overall (national) levels of migration to Britain and national media presentation of immigration and immigrants. Thus detecting local differences in the relationship between concern about immigration and political trust is likely to be difficult. In addition, we are not able to incorporate information about contact with immigrants, which has a powerful mediating effect on perceptions of immigrants and immigration (see, for instance, Thomas Pettigrew, 'Intergroup Contact Theory', *Annual Review of Psychology* 49 (1998): 65–85), into our analysis of the 2005 BES.

criteria, that it be fair, equitable, honest, efficient, and responsive to society's needs. In brief, an expression of trust in government (or synonymously political confidence and support) is a summary judgment that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny.⁴⁴

We are interested here in trust in the political system as a whole and thus examine trust in multiple components of this system. In particular, we examine trust in one of the key elected political institutions in Britain, the national parliament. We also explore the predictors of trust in an unelected institution, the police. Finally, we include an examination of the predictors of trust in politicians.⁴⁵

Prior research on political trust points to a wide range of potential explanations for individual-level differences in levels of political trust. Echoing the major 1980s and 1990s electoral studies' refrains of 'It's the Economy, Stupid' and drawing on Easton's model of the political system in which (perceived) outputs of the system are likely to produce long-term effects on perceptions of the system as a whole, many researchers have pointed to the role of economics in explaining differences in individual-level and aggregate-level perceptions of political institutions. Thus an economy that is performing poorly or perceptions that the national economy or one's own personal economic circumstances are declining (or are likely to decline) have all been argued to affect

⁴⁴ Arthur H. Miller, and Ola Listhaug, 'Political Parties and Confidence in Government: A Comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States', *British Journal of Political Science* 29 (1990): 357–86, p. 358.

⁴⁵ The choice of targets for our analysis of trust and distrust is limited by question availability. As will be seen below, we incorporate the panel component of the 2005 British Election Study, and trust in the parliament, police, and politicians are all measured in both the pre- and post-election survey, whereas other indicators of trust in politics and political institutions appear to only be measured in the post-election survey. However, we do not believe this is a major threat to the validity of the findings, as perceptions of government institutions besides those included here are strongly intercorrelated.

attitudes to political institutions.⁴⁶ Perceptions of the functioning of political institutions are also important: if governments are perceived to be fair and open, if politicians can be held accountable, and if individuals perceive governments to be performing well along various policy dimensions, individuals are more likely to trust.⁴⁷ Thus, levels of trust in politics are likely to be connected to the manner in which institutions function and whether citizens perceive governments to be performing well. More recently, scholars have linked distrust in politics to social capital, including voluntary and other informal participatory networks and interpersonal trust, although at the individual-level, the

⁴⁶ Harold D. Clarke, Nitish Dutt, and Allan Kornberg, 'The Political Economy of Attitudes towards Polity and Society in Western European Democracies', *Journal of Politics*, 55 (1993), 998–1021; Kenneth Newton, 'Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society and Political and Economic Performance', *Political Studies*, 54 (2006), 846–864; Christopher J. Anderson, and Christine A. Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems', *American Political Science Review*, 91 (1997), 66–81; Thomas R. Cusack, 'The Shaping of Popular Satisfaction with Government and Regime Performance in Germany', *British Journal of Political Science*, 29 (1999), 641–72; Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke, *Citizens and Community: Political Support in a Representative Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Ola Listhaug, 'The Dynamics of Trust in Politicians', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, *Citizens and the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 261–97, at pp. 288–94; Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg, 'Confidence in Political and Private Institutions', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, *Citizens and the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 298–322, at 316–20; Brad Lockerbie, 'Economic Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation in Western Europe', *British European Journal of Political Science*, 23 (1993), 281–93; Frederick D. Weil, 'The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies: A Consolidated Model Tested with Time-Series Data in Six Countries since World War II', *American Sociological Review*, 54 (1989), 682–706; Jack Citrin and Donald Philip Green, 'Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government', *British Journal of Political Science*, 16 (1986), 431–53; Arthur H. Miller, 'Is Confidence Rebounding?', *Public Opinion*, 6 (1983), 16–20; Virginia A. Chanley, Thomas J. Rudolph, and Wendy M. Rahn, 'The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government: A Time Series Analysis', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 64 (2000), 240–56; Hetherington, *Why Trust Matters*; William Mishler and Richard Rose, 'Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies', *Journal of Politics*, 59 (1997), 418–51; Gregory B. Markus, 'The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis', *American Journal of Political Science*, 32 (1988), 137–154.

⁴⁷ Miller and Listhaug 'Political Parties and Confidence in Government'; Arthur H. Miller and Ola Listhaug, 'Political Performance and Institutional Trust', in Pippa Norris, ed, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) pp. 204–16; Weil, 'The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies'; M. Stephen Weatherford, 'Measuring Political Legitimacy', *American Political Science Review*, 86 (1992), 149–66; Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies', *British Journal of Political Science*, 25 (1995), 485–514; Mischler and Rose, 'Trust, Distrust and Skepticism'; William Mischler and Richard Rose, 'What are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies', *Comparative Political Studies*, 34 (2001), 30–62; Kenneth Newton, 'Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society and Political and Economic Performance', *Political Studies*, 54 (2006), 846–864.

connection between interpersonal trust and political trust is still unclear: research from the U.S. indicates a reciprocal relationship, research from Central and Eastern Europe points to the conclusion that trust in institutions may, in fact, produce higher levels of interpersonal trust, and early research from Western Europe finds no connection between interpersonal and political trust at the micro-level,⁴⁸ while more recent analysis from European democracies indicates a relatively strong relationship between these variables.⁴⁹ Analyses also point to the effects of being electoral ‘losers’—i.e., voting for a party that fails to get into government—and indicate that losers may lose some degree of confidence in the political system.⁵⁰ The analysis below incorporates these explanations.

This paper makes strong claims about the impact of immigration on trust in British politics. Because of the strong claims being made, our primary aim in the analysis is to make the tests of our propositions as difficult as possible so that any evidence found in support of these propositions will be robust. We test our general proposition about the impact of perceptions of immigration by using a cross-sectional survey, the British Election Study of 2005, which includes a short panel component. We take advantage of the panel component of the 2005 BES in order to help reduce the likelihood of (a)

⁴⁸ John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, ‘Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital’, *American Journal of Political Science*, 41 (1997), 999-1023; William Mishler and Richard Rose, ‘What Are the Political Consequences of Trust?: A Test of Cultural and Institutional Theories in Russia’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 38 (2005), 1050-78; Kenneth Newton, ‘Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies’, in Pippa Norris, ed, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 169–87.

⁴⁹ Sonja Zmerli and Ken Newton, ‘Social Trust and Attitudes Toward Democracy’, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72(2008): 706-24.

⁵⁰ Anderson and Guillory ‘Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy’; Christopher J. Anderson and Andrew J. LoTempio, ‘Winning, losing and political trust in America’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 32 (2002), 335-51; Harold D. Clarke, and Allan Kornberg, ‘Do National Elections Affect Perceptions of MP Responsiveness: A Note on the Canadian Case’, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 17 (1992), 183-204; Harold D. Clarke and Alan C. Acock, ‘National Elections and Political Attitudes: The Case of Political Efficacy’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 19 (1989), 551-62; Paul F. Whiteley and Patrick Seyd, ‘The Dynamics of Party Activism in Britain: A Spiral of Demobilization?’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 28 (1998), 113-37.

spurious findings and (b) potential endogeneity problems. First, we incorporate a lagged dependent variable—that is, the respondent’s level of political trust at $t-1$, which is measured in the BES pre-election survey conducted between February and April 2005.⁵¹ This variable should help to reduce omitted variable bias, providing a control for any predictors of political trust that are not controlled for via other independent variables. Second, our indicators of concern about the impact of immigration and perceptions of government handling of immigration will be measured at $t-1$ while all other controls (perception of government handling of other policy areas, economic perceptions, etc.) will be contemporaneous. With the incorporation of a lagged dependent variable and lagged expressions of concern about immigration and perceptions of government handling of immigration, any significant relationship that is found is highly likely to run in the hypothesized direction rather than the reverse (that is, concern about immigration predicts political trust rather than the reverse).

We begin by estimating the simple model of:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \textit{Political Trust}_t = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{Political Trust}_{t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{Concern about Immigration}_{t-1} + \\
 & \beta_3 \textit{Perception of Government Handling of Immigration}_{t-1} + \beta_4 \textit{Concern about} \\
 & \textit{Immigration}_{t-1} * \textit{Perception of Government Handling of Immigration}_{t-1} + e_i
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{Equation 1}$$

That is, political trust as measured in the post-election study will be predicted by political trust in the pre-election survey, concern about immigration, perceptions of government

⁵¹ Interviews were conducted face-to-face in England, Wales, and Scotland; see Mark Johnson, Katarina Thomson and Shaun Scholes, British Election Study 2005 Technical Report March 2007, P2448/P2474/P2517; available at <http://www.essex.ac.uk/bes/2005/Survey%20Documents/bes%20technical%20report%20plus%20internet%202007.pdf>, accessed 28 July 2009; note that the pre-election British weight has been applied (see pp. 20-22 of the report).

handling of immigration, and the interaction between the latter two. We have incorporated two separate indicators of concern about the impact of immigration—one of these measures concern about the effect of immigration on culture and the other measures concern about impact of immigration on natives' jobs.⁵² Appendix A provides the question wording for these variables and Table 1 provides the estimates of coefficients for Equation 1.

[Table 1 about here]

Model 1 tests Hypotheses 1 and 2 and the results indicate that concern about the impact of immigration on culture and perceptions of government handling of immigration both have independent effects on trust in parliament and trust in politicians. Concern about the impact of immigration on the jobs of natives appears to have no statistically significant effect on political trust, as measured by trust in parliament, trust in politicians, or trust in the police. Given that our argument about the relationship between immigration-related worries and political trust revolved around notions of shared national culture, it is perhaps unsurprising that it is such concerns that have an impact on political trust. What about the size of the statistically significant effects, though? In the case of trust in parliament, concern about the effect of immigration on culture appears to produce a maximum effect of 0.60 on our 11-point scale of political trust, while the maximum effect of perceptions of government handling of immigration is 0.80. Thus, the overall impact of the two immigration variables combined (i.e., a shift from being least to most concerned about

⁵² We are limited to these two items by question availability in the BES; however, the two items do capture the main threats thought to be posed by immigration, namely cultural and economic threat (e.g., Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 'Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers').

immigration and from feeling the government has handled immigration very badly to feeling that government has handled it very well) produces a decline of approximately 1.4 on our 11-point indicator of trust in parliament. The combined effect of these variables on trust in politicians is slightly weaker, at 1.2. While this effect may not appear to be overwhelming, it is worth bearing in mind that this effect is produced after controlling for a lagged version of the dependent variable and using a lagged rather than contemporaneous indicator of the independent variable.⁵³ Note that concern about immigration does not appear to have a direct linear effect on trust in the police, but perception of government handling of immigration does have a small effect on the latter.

Model 2 of Table 1 tests the interactive effect of Hypothesis 3 and the results provide support for this hypothesis. Again, the effect is only present for concern about the impact of immigration on culture, not jobs. Moreover, the interactive effect is statistically significant for all three indicators of political trust. We revisit this relationship below.

In order to help further ensure robustness, we control for the wide range of variables found to be related to political trust in previous literature which were outlined briefly above: retrospective and prospective personal and national economic evaluations, evaluations of government performance across several policy areas (crime, health service, terrorism, the economy, and taxation), social capital (interpersonal trust and participation in voluntary organisations), and loser versus electoral winner status. Following the work

⁵³ The overall effect of the two variables without controls for trust at t-1 are even more powerful. For instance, a shift from being least to most concerned about immigration and from believing that government has handled immigration well to believing that government has handled immigration poorly has an overall effect of 2.85 on the 11-point scale of trust in parliament, an effect of 2.32 on trust in politicians, and 1.76 on trust in the police.

of Anderson⁵⁴ and Rohrschneider⁵⁵, we also incorporate controls for education, age, gender, and income.⁵⁶ In addition, we control for another potential winner/loser effect, membership in an ethnic minority group, which is likely to have an impact on trust in politics and political institutions (and should also be controlled for because it is likely to affect the relationship between attitudes toward immigration and political trust). We introduce an additional control for left-right self-placement as an indicator of general ideological predisposition, as this is likely to be connected to both attitudes toward immigration and distrust of national political institutions, with those identifying with the far-right being most hostile toward immigration and toward national political institutions. Dummy variables are also included for Scotland and Wales. Note that all of these variables are measured *contemporaneously*, and thus our lagged independent variables will be competing against contemporaneous measures. Again, this is done to help ensure a high level of robustness if the immigration-political trust relationship finds empirical support. In addition, the 2005 election took place at a time of heightened concern about Britain's involvement in Iraq and so we control for approval of involvement in the war.⁵⁷ In addition, as outlined above, the model incorporates a lagged dependent variable—that is, self-reported level of trust in each of our three institutions in the pre-election survey.

⁵⁴ Anderson and Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy'; Anderson and LoTempio, 'Winning, Losing and Political Trust in America'; Anderson and Paskeviciute. 'How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Influence the Prospects for Civil Society'; Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V. Tverdova, 'Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government in Contemporary Democracies', *International Political Science Review*, 22 (2001), 321-338; Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V. Tverdova, 'Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies', *American Journal of Political Science*, 47 (2003), 91-109.

⁵⁵ Rohrschneider, 'Institutional Quality and Perceptions of Representation in Advanced Industrial Democracies'.

⁵⁶ Job category had very little effect and has been omitted from the analysis.

⁵⁷ Note that the BES contains an indicator of perceptions of government handling of Iraq in the pre-election questionnaire, but when added to the regression below it is statistically insignificant.

Measures of all variables are provided in Appendix A, and the equation we estimate is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \textit{Political Trust}_t = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{Political Trust}_{t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{Concern about Immigration}_{t-1} + \\
 & \beta_3 \textit{Perception of Government Handling of Immigration}_{t-1} + \beta_4 \textit{Concern about} \\
 & \textit{Immigration}_{t-1} * \textit{Perception of Government Handling of Immigration}_{t-1} + \beta_5 \textit{Sociotropic} \\
 & \textit{retrospective economic evaluations}_t + \beta_6 \textit{Sociotropic prospective economic evaluations}_t \\
 & + \beta_7 \textit{Pocketbook retrospective economic evaluations}_t + \beta_8 \textit{Pocketbook prospective} \\
 & \textit{economic evaluations}_t + \beta_9 \textit{Perception of Government Handling of Crime}_t + \\
 & \beta_{10} \textit{Perception of Government Handling of Health Service}_t + \beta_{11} \textit{Perception of} \\
 & \textit{Government Handling of Terrorism}_t + \beta_{12} \textit{Perception of Government Handling of} \\
 & \textit{Economy}_t + \beta_{13} \textit{Perception of Government Handling of Taxation}_t + \beta_{14} \textit{Interpersonal} \\
 & \textit{Trust}_t + \beta_{15} \textit{Participation in Voluntary Activities}_t + \beta_{16} \textit{Voted Conservative}_t + \beta_{17} \textit{Voted} \\
 & \textit{LibDem}_t + \beta_{18} \textit{Voted Green}_t + \beta_{19} \textit{Voted UKIP}_t + \beta_{20} \textit{Voted BNP}_t + \beta_{21} \textit{Voted SNP}_t + \\
 & \beta_{22} \textit{Voted PlaidCymru}_t + \beta_{23} \textit{Voted OtherParty}_t + \beta_{24} \textit{DidNotVote}_t + \beta_{25} \textit{Education}_t + \\
 & \beta_{26} \textit{Age}_t + \beta_{27} \textit{Female}_t + \beta_{28} \textit{Income}_t + \beta_{29} \textit{Ethnic Minority}_t + \beta_{30} \textit{Left-right self-} \\
 & \textit{placement}_t + \beta_{31} \textit{Scotland}_t + \beta_{32} \textit{Wales}_t + \beta_{33} \textit{IraqApproval}_t + e_i
 \end{aligned}$$

(Equation 2)

Table 2 provides the coefficients for this equation, and these generally confirm the findings from the simple models in Table 1. That is, concern about the impact of immigration on culture, perceptions of government handling of immigration, and the interaction between these variables all appear to be statistically significant predictors of political trust, as measured by trust in parliament, trust in politicians and trust in the police. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the relationship between immigration concerns, perception of government handling of immigration, and political trust.⁵⁸ The relationship between attitudes to the impact of immigration on culture and

⁵⁸ Actual potential values of concern about immigration and perceptions of government handling of immigration have been inserted into the equations in Model 2 of Table 1 while the values of other variables are as follows. Political trust has been set to 5, which is the midpoint of the scale; all of the indicators of econ perceptions have been set to 3 (stayed the same); perceptions of government handling of non-immigration policies have been set to their centre point of 3; interpersonal trust has been set to its midpoint of 5; voluntary participation has been set to its midpoint of 2.5; all loser dummies are set to 0 and so the results represent a Labour voter; education dummies are also set to 0, with the results representing those for

perception of government handling of immigration is roughly similar across the three indicators of the dependent variable and is in the predicted direction. Namely, those who express negative views about the impact of immigrants on Britain's culture *and* believe that the government has handled the immigration issue fairly badly tend to be the least trusting of parliament, politicians, and the police, and the effect appears to be fairly substantial, again, particularly given that *lagged* indicators of these independent variables are used here and that the analysis also controls for lagged level of political trust. For those who believe immigrants have contributed to the country's culture, perceptions of government handling of immigration appear to have little effect on trust in politics

[Table 2 and Figure 1 about here]

Immigration-related concerns are, of course, not the only strong predictors of political trust. Perceptions of government handling of other issues such as the economy, as well as being an electoral loser, also predict political trust. However, the immigration variables are amongst the strongest predictors, despite not being measured contemporaneously. These findings support the propositions raised above: that worries about the impact of immigration on national culture and blaming the government for allowing increased immigration combine to create a group of citizens who are distrustful of their politicians and political institutions. Further implications of these findings will be discussed in the conclusion.

individuals with qualifications below university level; age is set to 50, which is the mean and median of this variable; gender is set to 0, which is the category for males; household income set to 7, the midpoint on the income scale; ethnic minority set to 0 (thus the equation represents non-minorities); left-right self-placement is set to 5; approval of involvement in Iraq has been set to 2.5; the Scotland and Wales country dummies are set to 0, thus the equation represents respondents living in England.

Analysis 2: The 2002-3 European Social Survey

Because the above analyses were conducted on data collected immediately before and after an election, and particularly after an election in which immigration was one of the issues emphasized by the main opposition (the Conservative Party), it is possible that the results are unusual. We thus believe it crucial to attempt to verify the results in differing circumstances. The 2002-3 European Social Survey was chosen for these purposes. The ESS was conducted shortly prior to the start of the unpopular war in Iraq (the final set of interviews was conducted in February 2003, and the Iraq War began 20 March 2003) and outside of the context of a general election. This survey does not contain the wide array of questions on perceptions of government handling of specific policies, including perceptions of government handling of immigration or asylum, nor the entire range of questions about economic perceptions included in the 2005 BES. However, it does include variables that can be used as proxies for economic perceptions and satisfaction with government handling of policy in general. Indicators of these variables are provided in Appendix 2.

In the ESS, the survey items pertaining to trust in politics that best correspond to the BES pre-election indicators are trust in the national parliament, trust in politicians, and trust in the legal system. Unfortunately, no questions were asked pertaining to perceptions of government handling of immigration or asylum and so Hypotheses 2 and 3 cannot be investigated. Instead, we provide a simple analysis of the relationship between concern about the impact of immigration on the national community and political trust, controlling for interpersonal trust, voluntary participation, satisfaction with the way

democracy works in the country, the electoral loser effect, perceptions of the national economy, perceptions of one's personal economic situation, age, education, income, gender, minority status, and left-right self-placement.

Table 3 presents the models for political trust in the British portion of the ESS sample. Although there are no measures of perceptions of government handling of various policy areas, we have incorporated a control for general satisfaction with the way democracy is working in the country, which—not surprisingly—has a relatively large impact on trust in the British parliament (democracy satisfaction ranges from 0 to 10). Even in the presence of this and the other powerful controls, the coefficients for concern about immigration also achieve statistical significance, with a maximum impact of 1.4 in the case of trust in parliament (the variable ranges from 0 to 10 in the ESS data set), 1.2 in the case of trust in politicians, and 0.70 for trust in the legal system.⁵⁹ Thus, the ESS results provide further confirmation of a connection between concern about the impact of immigration and political trust. We now turn to the conclusion to discuss the implications of these findings.

[Table 3 about here]

Conclusion

⁵⁹ The maximum effect of perceptions that immigrants undermine national culture on trust in parliament is 0.70 while the maximum impact of perceptions that immigrants are bad for the economy is also 0.70, for a combined total of 1.40 (with political trust and perceptions of immigrants both measured on a 0-10 scale). Note that we do not include the statistically insignificant coefficient of 0.03 in our computation of the effect of perceptions of immigrants' contribution to culture on trust in the legal system. Note also that the authors have conducted similar analyses using the BES 2001 data set, which measures 'respect' for various institutions and politicians rather than trust. The results are remarkably similar to those for the ESS data set, with concern about immigration having a similar sized impact on respect for parliament, politicians, and the courts as those reported here for the ESS data set (analyses available from the authors).

While concern about immigration has had clear effects on the political landscape of Europe via the changing nature of European party systems, this paper contends that the effects of such sentiment in Britain are more subtle and are likely to operate via general feelings about the political system. Successive periods of immigration have been met with policies that highlight the degree of discomfort with being a country of immigration on the part of policymakers and ordinary citizens. Prior research points to the conclusion that such discomfort is rarely related to personal self interest⁶⁰ and instead stems from concern about the effect of immigration on the national community and the threats that immigrants are perceived to pose to this community, including those related to identity and economic resources. This study indicates that such concerns may not be inconsequential in Britain but may instead lead to a weakening of ties between the governed and the governors by seemingly undermining the very basis on which such connections were originally built—the common sense of shared myths, history, and culture. The potential consequences of reduced political trust are considerable because trust is crucial to effective policymaking,⁶¹ compliance with government regulations⁶²

⁶⁰ Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior. 'Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers'; Quillian, 'Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat'; McLaren and Johnson, 'Resources, Group Conflict, and Symbols'.

⁶¹ Mishler and Rose 'Trust, Distrust and Skepticism', pp. 418-19; see also Luke Keele, 'Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government', *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2007), 241-54; Bernard Barber, *The Logic and Limits of Trust* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983); Valeri Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, eds, *Trust and Governance* (New York: Russell Sage, 1998); John T. Scholz and Mark Lubell, 'Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action', *American Journal of Political Science*, 42 (1998), 398-417; John T. Scholz, and Neil Pinney, 'Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior', *American Journal of Political Science*, 39 (1995), 490-512; Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 'The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government'.

⁶² See Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, 'Political trust and trustworthiness', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3 (2000), 475-507, p. 491; Tom Tyler, 'Obeying the Law in America: Procedural Justice and the Sense of Fairness', *Issues of Democracy*, 6 (2001), 16-21; Braithwaite and Levi, *Trust and Governance*; Marc J. Hetherington, 'The Political Relevance of Political Trust', *American Political Science Review*, 92 (1998), 791-808; John T. Scholz, 'Trust, Taxes and Compliance', in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, eds, *Trust and Governance* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998), pp. 135-166; Scholz and Lubell, 'Trust and Taxpaying'.

and engagement in civically moral behaviour.⁶³ Political trust is also thought to be crucial to the representative relationship that lies at the heart of most democratic regimes.⁶⁴

While the most immediate response to the argument and findings presented here may be the simple one of ‘closing the gates’, such a solution would not solve the problem raised by this paper. Whether British citizens like it or not, Britain has become a country of immigration and closing the gates would have no impact on the millions of immigrants and their families who are already in the country and consider it to be their home. Thus, perhaps an alternative solution is to revisit the construction of British identity, using the analyses of historians briefly highlighted above, with the aim of more clearly establishing what British identity comprises and where the country’s millions of foreigners fit within this construct. At the very least, it must be recognized that immigration may be having long-term, unanticipated consequences for the functioning of the political system, which seem to require more open debate and discussion.

⁶³ Natalia Letki, ‘Investigating the Roots of Civic Morality: Trust, Social Capital, and Institutional Performance’, *Political Behavior*, 28 (2006), 305-325.

⁶⁴ William T. Bianco, *Trust: Representatives and Constituents* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Mishler and Rose, ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism’ and ‘What are the Origins of Political Trust?’, Braithwaite and Levi, *Trust and Governance*.

Appendix A: Measurement of Variables in Analysis 1

Note that all BES 2005 Post-Election question wording is available at

<http://www.essex.ac.uk/bes/2005/Documents/BES05%20Postwave%20CAPI%20questionnaire.pdf>, accessed 29 May 2009. The pre-election questionnaire is available at

<http://www.essex.ac.uk/bes/2005/Documents/PreCAPIMay31.pdf>, also accessed 29 May 2009.

Dependent Variable: Trust Politicians and Political Institutions (post-election questionnaire)

Now, thinking about British political institutions like Parliament, please use the 0 to 10 scale to indicate how much trust you have for each of the following, where 0 means no trust and 10 means a great deal of trust.

And, how much do you trust the Parliament at Westminster? [bq20b]

And how much do you trust British politicians generally? [bq20c]

And how much do you trust the Police? [bq20d]

Dependent Variable: Trust Politicians and Political Institutions _{t-1} (pre-election questionnaire)

Now, thinking about British political institutions like Parliament, please use the 0 to 10 scale to indicate how much trust you have for each of the following, where 0 means no trust and 10 means a great deal of trust.

Firstly, how much do you trust the Parliament at Westminster? [aq15a]

And how much do you trust British politicians generally? [aq15b]

And how much do you trust the Police? [aq15c]

Concern about the impact of immigration on the national community _{t-1} (pre-election questionnaire)

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

Immigrants make Britain more open to new ideas and cultures. (Please take your answers from this card.) 1 Strongly agree; 2 Agree; 3 Neither agree nor disagree; 4 Disagree; 5 Strongly disagree [aq45b]

Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Britain. (Please take your answers from this card.) 1 Strongly agree; 2 Agree; 3 Neither agree nor disagree; 4 Disagree; 5 Strongly disagree [aq45g]

The coding of the second item was reversed, and so the high value of 5 represents the strongest concern about the impact of immigration for both items.

Perception of Government Handling of Immigration _{t-1} (pre-election questionnaire)

How well do you think the present government has handled each of the following issues?

The number of asylum-seekers coming to Britain. 1 Very well; 2 Fairly well; 3 Neither well nor badly; 4 Fairly badly; 5 Very badly. [aq4c]

It must be noted that perceptions of government handling of the immigration issue is measured here with an indicator of perceptions of government handling of *asylum-seekers*. This item has been chosen because it is the only available indicator of

perceptions of government handling of an immigration-related issue in the BES data set. Although there are clear legal distinctions to be made between ‘immigrants’ and ‘asylum seekers’, in the case of Britain—as pointed out by Joppke—there appears to be ‘a zealous and instant equation of asylum seeking with immigration’,⁶⁵ with British asylum policy being structurally conflated with immigration control.⁶⁶ Moreover, analyses of survey data indicate that the vast majority of citizens of the UK prefer that economic immigrants and asylum seekers be treated identically. For instance, in a Eurobarometer poll from Spring 2000 (EB 53), over 70 per cent of British respondents would suggest identical treatment for people coming from Muslim countries and Eastern Europe seeking work as they would for asylum seekers.⁶⁷ This is true even when the question about asylum is posed in terms of individuals fleeing from serious internal conflict (e.g. civil war).

Economic Evaluations (post-election questionnaire)

Now a few questions about economic conditions.

[Retrospective pocketbook evaluations] How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? (Please take your answers from this card.) 1 Got a lot worse; 2 Got a little worse; 3 Stayed the same; 4 Got a little better; 5 Got a lot better [bq23]

[Retrospective sociotropic evaluations] How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months? (Please take your answers from this card.) 1 Got a lot worse; 2 Got a little worse; 3 Stayed the same; 4 Got a little better; 5 Got a lot better [bq24]

⁶⁵ Joppke, ‘Asylum and State Sovereignty’, p. 264.

⁶⁶ Joppke, ‘Asylum and State Sovereignty’, p. 285.

⁶⁷ Poll available for online analysis at <http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp>, accessed 20 July 2009.

[Prospective pocketbook evaluations] How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the next 12 months? (Please take your answers from this card.) 1 Get a lot worse; 2 Get a little worse; 3 Stay the same; 4 Get a little better; 5 Get a lot better [bq25]

[Prospective sociotropic evaluations] How do you think the general economic situation in this country will develop over the next 12 months? (Please take your answers from this card.) 1 Get a lot worse; 2 Get a little worse; 3 Stay the same; 4 Get a little better; 5 Get a lot better [bq26]

Perceived Political Performance (Government Performance on Various Policy Dimensions) (post-election questionnaire)

How well do you think the present government has handled each of the following issues?

Crime in Britain [bq3a]

The National Health Service [bq3c]

The risk of terrorism in Britain [bq3d]

The economy in general [bq3e]

The level of taxation [bq3f]

Each of these questions is asked in turn, with respondents given the following response options: 1 Very well; 2 Fairly well; 3 Neither well nor badly; 4 Fairly badly; 5 Very badly.

Social Capital: Interpersonal trust (post-election questionnaire)

On balance, would you say that most people can't be trusted or that most people can be trusted? Please use the 0 to 10 scale to indicate your view. (Please take your answers from this card.) 0 Most people can't be trusted...10 Most people can be trusted [bq56]

Do you think that most people you come into contact with would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair? Please use the 0 to 10 scale again, where 0 means would try to take advantage and 10 means would try to be fair.

(Please take your answers from this card.) 0 Try to take advantage...10 Try to be fair [bq57]

These two items were added together and summated scores divided by 2 to create a 0 to 10 scale, with 10 representing the highest level of interpersonal trust.

The correlation (Pearson's r) between these two items was 0.61 and Cronbach's alpha was 0.75.

Social Capital: Participation in Voluntary Activities (post-election questionnaire)

Again, over the past few years, how active have you been in a voluntary organisation, like a local community association, a charity, or a sports club? 1 Very active; 2 Somewhat active; 3 A little active; 4 Not at all active/Not involved [bq52]

Note that the coding of this item has been reversed.

Electoral Winning and Losing (post-election questionnaire)

Dummy variables were created for those who claimed to have voted for each of the following parties in the 2005 general election: Conservative Party, Liberal Democrat Party, Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, Green Party, United Kingdom Independence Party, British National Party, or any other party; a dummy variable was also created for those who did not vote. Thus, the comparison category is those who were the 'winners' (i.e., voted for the Labour Party).

Approval of Britain's Involvement in Iraq (post-election questionnaire)

Please tell me whether you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britain's involvement in Iraq. 1 Strongly approve; 2 Approve; 3 Disapprove; 4 Strongly disapprove [bq42] (coding reversed).

Education (post-election questionnaire)

Do you have any educational or work-related qualifications? 1 Yes; 2 No [bq82a]
IF 'yes' at [bq82a] Taking your answers from this card, which is the highest qualification you have? Please just give me the number next to it. 1 Postgraduate degree; 2 First degree; 3 University/polytechnic diploma; 4 Teaching qualification; 5 Nursing qualification; 6 HNC/HND, City&Guilds level 4, NVQ/SVQ 4/5; 7 A level and equiv; 8 Scottish Higher and equiv; 9 ONC/OND, City&Guilds level 3, NVQ/SVQ 3; 10 GCSE A*-C, CSE grade 1, O level grade A-C; 11 Scottish Standard grades, Ordinary bands; 12 GCSE D-G, CSE grades 2-5, O level D-E; 13 City&Guilds level 2, NVQ/SVQ 2 and equiv; 14 City&Guilds level 1, NVQ/SVQ 1 and equiv; 15 Clerical and commercial

qualifications; 16 Recognized trade apprenticeship; 17 Youth training certificate, skill seekers; 18 Other technical, professional or higher qualification (WRITE IN)

Two dummy variables were created from this pair of questions. One dummy variable represented those who claimed to have no qualifications in the first item; the second dummy variable represented those who claim to have a postgraduate or undergraduate degree (codes 1 or 2 in the second item). Thus the omitted educational category is qualifications below degree level.

Age (post-election questionnaire)

Now, a few questions about yourself and your background. What was your age last birthday? [bq77]

Gender (post-election questionnaire)

INTERVIEWER TO OBSERVE AND RECORD: GENDER OF RESPONDENT

1 Male; 2 Female [bq76]

This variable recoded such that female=1 and male=0.

Income (post-election questionnaire)

Which of the letters on this card represents the total income of your household from all sources before tax - including benefits, saving and so on? Please just tell me the letter.

(CARD J4 19) 1 Q; 2 T; 3 O; 4 K; 5 L; 6 B; 7 Z; 8 M; 9 F; 10 J; 11 D; 12 H; 13 P [bq84]

The showcard looks as follows:

Weekly income from all sources before tax		Annual income from all sources before tax
Less than £96	Q	Less than £5,000
£97 - £192	T	£5,001 - £10,000
£193 - £288	O	£10,001 - £15,000
£289 - £384	K	£15,001 - £20,000
£385 - £480	L	£20,001 - £25,000
£481 - £577	B	£25,001 - £30,000
£578 - £673	Z	£30,001 - £35,000
£674 - £769	M	£35,001 - £40,000
£770 - £865	F	£40,001 - £45,000
£866 - £961	J	£45,001 - £50,000
£962 - £1,153	D	£50,001 - £60,000
£1,154 - £1,346	H	£60,001 - £70,000
£1,347 or more	P	£70,001 or more

(BES post-election questionnaire from

<http://www.essex.ac.uk/bes/2005/Documents/BES05%20Postwave%20CAPI%20questionnaire.pdf>, accessed 29 May 2009, p. 88.)

Ethnic Minority Status (post-election questionnaire)

To which of these groups do you consider you belong? 1 White British; 2 Any other white background (WRITE IN); 3 White and Black Caribbean; 4 White and Black African; 5 White and Asian; 6 Any other mixed background (WRITE IN); 7 Indian; 8 Pakistani; 9 Bangladeshi; 10 Any other Asian background (WRITE IN); 11 Black Caribbean; 12 Black African; 13 Any other Black background (WRITE IN); 14 Chinese; 15 Other ethnic group (WRITE IN). [bq108]

Categories 1 and 2 were recoded to a value of 1 and all other categories were given a code of 0.

Left-right self-placement (post-election questionnaire)

In politics, people sometimes talk about parties and politicians as being on the left or right. Using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0 means left and the end marked 10 means right, where would you place yourself on this scale?

(Please take your answers from this card.) 0 Left; 1 one; 2 two; 3 three; 4 four; 5 five; 6 six; 7 seven; 8 eight; 9 nine; 10 Right [bq39a]

Appendix B: Measurement of Variables in Analysis 2

Note that all ESS 2002-3 question wording is available at

<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>, accessed 25 August 2008.

Distrust in political institutions

CARD 11: Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly...READ OUT [country]'s parliament? the politicians? the legal system?

Concern about the impact of immigration on the national community

D27 CARD 29 Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? Please use this card. Bad for the economy (0), Good for the economy (10).

D28 CARD 30 And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Cultural life undermined (0), Cultural life enriched (10).

The coding of each of these items was reversed.

Economic Evaluations

[Sociotropic evaluations] B30 STILL CARD 13: On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]? Still use this card. Extremely Dissatisfied (0), Extremely satisfied (10).

[Pocketbook evaluations] F31 CARD 57 Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays? Living comfortably on present income(1) Coping on present income(2) Finding it difficult on present income(3) Finding it very difficult on present income(4).

Perceived Political Performance

B32 STILL CARD 13 On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? Extremely Dissatisfied (0), Extremely satisfied (10).

Social Capital: Interpersonal trust

A8 CARD 3: Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score

of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.

A9 CARD 4: Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? Most people would try to take advantage of me (0) Most people would try to be fair (10).

Pearson's r for the two items is 0.58. The items were combined into a single index, with values ranging from 0 to 10.

Social Capital: Participation in Voluntary Activities

E1-12 a) CARD 43 For each of the voluntary organisations I will now mention, please use this card to tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months, and, if so, which.

Respondents who claimed to participate in any of the organizations listed (or in one not listed) were given a code of 1; those who do not participate in any activities were given a code of 0.

Electoral Winning and Losing

Dummy variables were created for respondents who claim to have voted for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, regional parties, or who refused or claimed they did not know which party they voted for; the comparison category is the 'winners', or Labour voters.

Other Controls

Education: F6 CARD 53 What is the highest level of education you have achieved? (0= Not completed primary education; 1= Primary or first stage of basic; 2= Lower secondary or second stage of basic; 3=Upper secondary; 4=Post secondary, non-tertiary; 5=First stage of tertiary; 6=Second stage of tertiary).

Age: F3 In what year were you born?

Gender: coded by interviewer.

Income: F30 CARD 56 Using this card, if you add up the income from all sources, which letter describes your household's total net income? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income.

Ethnic minority status: C24 Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]? (0 if no, 1 if yes)

Left-right self-placement: B28 CARD 12: In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? As with the BES, this variable was dummied so as to incorporate the refusals and ‘don’t know’ responses.

Table 1. Political Trust and Attitudes to Immigration, BES Results (Simple Model)

	Model 1			Model 2		
	b	SE	p	b	SE	p
<u>Trust Parliament</u>						
(Constant)	4.40	0.19	0.000	3.12	0.45	0.000
Trust parliament t_{-1}	0.45	0.01	0.000	0.45	0.01	0.000
Concern about impact of immigration on culture t_{-1}	-0.15	0.04	0.000	0.68	0.18	0.000
Concern about impact of immigration on jobs t_{-1}	0.01	0.03	0.781	-0.24	0.15	0.122
Government handling of immigration t_{-1}	-0.20	0.04	0.000	0.11	0.11	0.321
Concern about culture*govt handling of immigration t_{-1}	--			-0.19	0.04	0.000
Concern about jobs*govt handling of immigration t_{-1}	--			0.06	0.04	0.110
Adjusted R2		0.34			0.35	
SEE		1.66			1.65	
<u>Trust Politicians</u>						
(Constant)	3.78	0.17	0.000	2.26	0.42	0.000
Trust politicians t_{-1}	0.47	0.01	0.000	0.46	0.01	0.000
Concern about impact of immigration on culture t_{-1}	-0.10	0.03	0.003	0.55	0.17	0.001
Concern about impact of immigration on jobs t_{-1}	-0.02	0.03	0.479	-0.02	0.14	0.905
Government handling of immigration t_{-1}	-0.17	0.04	0.000	0.20	0.10	0.053
Concern about culture*govt handling of immigration t_{-1}	--			-0.15	0.04	0.000
Concern about jobs*govt handling of immigration t_{-1}	--			0.00	0.03	0.938
Adjusted R2		0.34			0.34	
SEE		1.55			1.54	
<u>Trust Police</u>						
(Constant)	3.15	0.18	0.000	1.51	0.42	0.000
Trust police t_{-1}	0.62	0.01	0.000	0.61	0.01	0.000
Concern about impact of immigration on culture t_{-1}	-0.06	0.03	0.095	0.46	0.17	0.008
Concern about impact of immigration on jobs t_{-1}	-0.02	0.03	0.630	0.17	0.15	0.251
Government handling of immigration t_{-1}	-0.14	0.04	0.000	0.27	0.10	0.010
Concern about culture*govt handling of immigration t_{-1}	--			-0.12	0.04	0.002
Concern about jobs*govt handling of immigration t_{-1}	--			-0.04	0.03	0.183
Adjusted R2		0.43			0.43	
SEE		1.57			1.57	

Note: coefficients are unstandardized OLS coefficients; see the text of the paper and Appendix A for the description of the variables and question wording; N=2545.

Table 2. Political Trust Political Trust and Attitudes to Immigration, BES Results (Full Model)

	Parliament			Politicians			Police		
	b	SE	p	b	SE	p	b	SE	p
(Constant)	2.86	0.57	0.000	1.98	0.54	0.000	1.22	0.56	0.028
Trust _{t-1}	0.33	0.01	0.000	0.37	0.02	0.000	0.54	0.01	0.000
Immigration attitudes									
Concern about impact of immigration on culture _{t-1}	0.63	0.17	0.000	0.47	0.16	0.004	0.41	0.17	0.014
Concern about impact of immigration on jobs _{t-1}	-0.26	0.14	0.073	-0.09	0.14	0.497	0.11	0.14	0.427
Government handling of immigration _{t-1}	0.20	0.10	0.054	0.23	0.10	0.019	0.32	0.10	0.002
Concern about culture*govt handling of immigration _{t-1}	-0.17	0.04	0.000	-0.13	0.04	0.001	-0.10	0.04	0.007
Concern about jobs*govt handling of immigration _{t-1}	0.07	0.03	0.030	0.02	0.03	0.564	-0.03	0.03	0.423
Economic Perspectives									
Sociotropic retrospective	0.07	0.05	0.115	0.04	0.04	0.321	0.03	0.05	0.552
Sociotropic prospective	0.08	0.05	0.086	0.12	0.04	0.006	0.13	0.04	0.005
Pocketbook retrospective	0.00	0.04	0.996	0.07	0.04	0.053	0.02	0.04	0.550
Pocketbook prospective	0.00	0.05	0.957	-0.14	0.04	0.001	-0.08	0.04	0.061
Perceived Government handling of:									
Crime	-0.05	0.04	0.145	-0.10	0.03	0.003	-0.14	0.04	0.000
Health Service	-0.09	0.04	0.015	-0.15	0.03	0.000	-0.10	0.03	0.006
Terrorism	-0.16	0.03	0.000	-0.06	0.03	0.076	-0.12	0.03	0.001
Economy	-0.26	0.04	0.000	-0.08	0.04	0.073	0.02	0.04	0.640
Taxation	-0.11	0.04	0.002	-0.11	0.04	0.002	-0.09	0.04	0.015
Social Capital									
Interpersonal trust	0.10	0.02	0.000	0.09	0.02	0.000	0.15	0.02	0.000
Participation in voluntary activities	0.00	0.03	0.907	-0.04	0.03	0.147	0.00	0.03	0.968
Electoral losers: Voted...									
Conservative	-0.36	0.10	0.000	-0.25	0.10	0.011	-0.21	0.10	0.039
Liberal Democrats	-0.10	0.10	0.333	-0.01	0.10	0.942	-0.07	0.10	0.472
Green	-0.31	0.49	0.532	-1.10	0.47	0.019	-0.84	0.48	0.079
UKIP	-0.35	0.26	0.177	-0.27	0.25	0.273	-0.27	0.25	0.289
BNP	-0.63	0.63	0.316	-0.31	0.60	0.606	-0.98	0.62	0.113
SNP	-0.02	0.30	0.936	0.30	0.29	0.296	-0.29	0.29	0.317
Plaid Cymru	-1.12	0.46	0.016	-0.38	0.44	0.392	-0.68	0.45	0.131
Other party	-0.98	0.44	0.025	0.06	0.41	0.888	0.30	0.42	0.477
Did not vote	-0.35	0.09	0.000	-0.25	0.09	0.004	-0.29	0.09	0.001
Other controls									
Education									
No qualifications	0.05	0.08	0.509	0.11	0.08	0.144	0.05	0.08	0.535
University degree	0.22	0.09	0.017	0.29	0.09	0.001	0.14	0.09	0.136
Age	0.01	0.00	0.005	0.00	0.00	0.078	0.00	0.00	0.828
Female	0.07	0.06	0.292	0.14	0.06	0.019	0.09	0.06	0.148
Household income									
Level 2	0.30	0.21	0.148	0.44	0.20	0.027	0.10	0.21	0.634
Level 3	0.07	0.21	0.729	0.17	0.20	0.389	0.02	0.20	0.940
Level 4	0.26	0.21	0.216	0.32	0.20	0.107	0.13	0.21	0.521

Level 5	0.42	0.22	0.053	0.30	0.20	0.139	0.07	0.21	0.742
Level 6	0.25	0.22	0.245	0.14	0.21	0.495	-0.10	0.21	0.632
Level 7	0.20	0.23	0.363	0.14	0.21	0.517	0.04	0.22	0.839
Level 8	0.40	0.23	0.077	0.42	0.21	0.052	0.46	0.22	0.035
Level 9	0.11	0.23	0.623	-0.22	0.22	0.310	-0.07	0.22	0.741
Level 10	0.34	0.23	0.138	0.40	0.22	0.069	0.02	0.23	0.942
Level 11	0.17	0.24	0.477	0.26	0.23	0.258	-0.27	0.23	0.248
Level 12	0.19	0.27	0.481	-0.07	0.25	0.789	-0.13	0.26	0.615
Level 13	0.15	0.24	0.538	0.09	0.22	0.682	0.17	0.23	0.463
Income—refused	0.23	0.21	0.281	0.22	0.20	0.277	0.03	0.20	0.865
Ethnic minority	0.25	0.13	0.051	0.06	0.12	0.654	-0.30	0.13	0.020
Left-right self-placement	0.05	0.02	0.014	0.13	0.02	0.000	0.09	0.02	0.000
Wales	0.00	0.15	0.977	0.04	0.14	0.749	-0.24	0.14	0.097
Scotland	-0.21	0.12	0.081	-0.16	0.12	0.157	-0.11	0.12	0.369
Approve of Britain's involvement in Iraq	0.20	0.04	0.000	0.18	0.04	0.000	0.04	0.04	0.278
Adjusted R squared	0.45			0.42			0.49		
SEE	1.52			1.45			1.49		

Note: coefficients are unstandardized OLS coefficients; see the text of the paper and Appendix A for the description of the variables and question wording; N=2545.

Table 3. Political Trust Political Trust and Attitudes to Immigration, ESS Results

	Parliament			Politicians			Legal system		
	b	SE	p	b	SE	p	b	SE	p
(Constant)	3.27	0.64	0.000	1.65	0.62	0.008	2.76	0.71	0.000
Immigration attitudes									
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	-0.07	0.02	0.003	-0.05	0.02	0.033	-0.03	0.03	0.242
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	-0.07	0.02	0.005	-0.07	0.03	0.003	-0.07	0.03	0.016
Economic Perspectives									
Satisfied with present state of economy in country	0.16	0.02	0.000	0.18	0.02	0.000	0.13	0.03	0.000
Difficult to live on present income	-0.08	0.76	0.220	-0.06	0.07	0.357	-0.45	0.87	0.055
Perceptions of government performance									
Satisfied with the way democracy works in the country	0.36	0.02	0.000	0.30	0.02	0.000	0.33	0.03	0.000
Social Capital									
Trust other people	0.18	0.03	0.000	0.20	0.03	0.000	0.98	0.03	0.000
Participation in voluntary activities	0.15	0.09	0.095	0.10	0.09	.274	0.07	0.10	0.508
Electoral losers: Voted...									
Conservative	-0.52	0.14	0.000	-0.34	0.14	0.012	0.17	0.16	0.270
Liberal Democrats	-0.63	0.16	0.000	-0.47	0.15	0.002	0.23	0.17	0.180
Regional Party	-0.76	0.24	0.002	-0.43	0.23	0.066	-0.40	0.27	0.133
Other Party	-0.28	0.39	0.476	-0.30	0.38	0.435	0.76	0.44	0.083
Did not vote	-0.65	0.12	0.000	-0.43	0.12	0.001	-0.04	0.13	0.758
Refused to answer	-0.28	0.28	0.321	-0.37	0.27	0.174	0.07	0.32	0.824
Don't know	-0.94	0.43	0.031	-0.82	0.41	0.046	-0.17	0.47	0.719
Other controls									
Education	0.03	0.04	0.441	-0.07	0.04	0.073	0.01	0.04	0.740
Age	-0.01	0.00	0.027	-0.01	0.00	0.001	-0.01	0.00	0.000
Female	-0.17	0.09	0.062	0.30	0.09	0.001	0.09	0.10	0.363
Household Income									
Level 2	-0.60	0.62	0.334	0.40	0.59	0.495	0.06	0.68	0.929
Level 3	-0.55	0.56	0.325	0.08	0.55	0.887	-0.15	0.63	0.815
Level 4	-0.74	0.52	0.151	0.04	0.50	0.933	-0.15	0.57	0.795
Level 5	-0.95	0.52	0.071	-0.04	0.51	0.942	-0.21	0.58	0.722
Level 6	-0.64	0.52	0.221	0.26	0.51	0.612	0.11	0.58	0.854
Level 7	-0.81	0.53	0.127	0.00	0.52	0.994	-0.41	0.59	0.490
Level 8	-0.79	0.53	0.138	0.12	0.52	0.812	0.11	0.59	0.853
Level 9	-0.97	0.52	0.063	-0.13	0.51	0.803	-0.12	0.58	0.835
Level 10	-0.92	0.54	0.086	-0.16	0.52	0.764	-0.20	0.60	0.733

Level 11	-0.84	0.58	0.147	-0.02	0.56	0.967	0.16	0.64	0.800
Level 12	-0.44	0.58	0.448	0.20	0.56	0.726	0.15	0.64	0.817
Refused	-0.30	0.54	0.577	0.19	0.53	0.720	-0.03	0.60	0.962
Don't know	-0.62	0.54	0.249	0.33	0.52	0.526	0.01	0.60	0.990
Ethnic minority	-0.30	0.19	0.115	-0.19	0.18	0.295	0.05	0.21	0.811
Left-right self-placement	0.03	0.03	0.366	0.02	0.03	0.416	0.07	0.03	0.030
Wales	-0.07	0.18	0.679	-0.09	0.17	0.619	-0.36	0.20	0.067
Scotland	-0.05	0.16	0.766	-0.20	0.16	0.191	-0.15	0.18	0.413
Adj R2		0.35			0.31			0.25	
SEE		1.87			1.82			2.08	

Note: coefficients are unstandardized OLS coefficients; see the text of the paper and Appendix B for the description of the variables and question wording; N=1844.

Figure 1. Immigration and Political Trust, Interactive Effects




Figure 1a.




Figure 1b.




Figure 1c.

Note: figures were created by substituting high, medium, and low values for the immigration variables while holding all non-dichotomous variables at their means. All dichotomous variables (e.g., gender, region, and minority status) were set to 0.