Past seminars
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MET Seminar - Tan Gan (LSE)
16:00 - 17:00 14 October 2026
Title: Robust Delegation Authors: Ricardo Alonso, Tan Gan & Ju Hu Abstract: We study delegation rules by principals uninformed of the underlying state (external uncertainty) and the preferences of better-informed agents (internal uncertainty). Evaluating delegation sets with a max–min criterion,...
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MET Seminar - En Hua Hu (Oxford)
16:00 - 17:00 7 October 2026
Title: What makes a matching market congested Authors: Justin Hadad & En Hua Hu Abstract: We study a decentralized matching market where each applicant sends a fixed number of applications, and then firms make one offer. Our game emulates matching markets under time constraints: agents who are unmatched...
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MET Seminar - Alkis Georgiadis-Harris (Warwick)
16:00 - 17:00 29 April 2026
Title: Perfect Secrecy in the Wild Authors: Costas Cavounidis, Massimiliano Furlan & Alkis Georgiadis-Harris Abstract: Alice wishes to reveal the state X to Bob, if he knows some other information Y also known to her. If Bob does not, she wishes to reveal nothing about X at all. When can Alice accomplish...
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MET Seminar - Ina Taneva (Edinburgh)
17:00 - 18:00 18 March 2026
Title: Strategic Ignorance and Information Design Authors: Ina Taneva & Thomas Wiseman Abstract: We study information design in strategic settings when agents can publicly refuse to view their private signals. Ignoring the constraints that agents must be willing to view their signals may lead to...
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MET Seminar - Omer Edhan (Manchester)
17:00 - 18:00 11 March 2026
Title: Lyapunov Games Authors: Omer Edhan Idan & Ziv Hellman Abstract: Decentralised learning is often used to explain how play might settle on equilibrium, but even natural adjustment rules can produce persistent cycling. We identify broad conditions under which learning in population games does...
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